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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - EQUAL PROTECTION - RACIAL SEGREGATION OF 
SPECTATOR SEATING IN COURTROOM - Defendant, judge of a municipal 
court in Virginia, assigned seating on the basis of race in that part of his 
courtroom reserved for spectators and for those awaiting the call of their 
business before the court. The same number of seats were provided for 
Negroes as for whites. There was no separation of the races in the area 
immediately before the bench nor was there any complaint of discrimina-
tion in the administration of justice. Plaintiffs are Negroes who have been 
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required on more than one occasion to occupy seats in the spectator sec-
tion on a racially-segregated basis. In a suit brought in the federal district 
court for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief,1 held, complaint 
dismissed. Plaintiffs had no rights granted or guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion which were violated by the practice of racially-segregated seating in 
the spectator portion of a state courtroom. Wells v. Gilliam, 196 F. Supp. 
792 (E.D. Va. 1961). 
The fourteenth amendment requires that no state shall "deny to any 
person ... the equal protection of the laws."2 To come within the purview 
of the equal protection clause a particular action must be attributable to 
the state and must be discriminatory. The acts of a judge pursuant to his 
judicial function have long been recognized as within the concept of "state 
action."3 In determining whether state action is discriminatory it is 
generally accepted that some classification by the states must be permitted, 
and that considerable discretion should be allowed in defining the class.4 
Originally the Supreme Court announced that reasonable classifications 
pursuant to valid legislative objectives would satisfy the constitutional 
standard.5 Requiring segregation of the Negro and white races where 
separate but equal facilities were provided was considered to be reason-
able. However, the concept of equal protection was substantially expanded 
in Brown v. Board of Educ.6 The Court there held that the "separate but 
equal" doctrine has no place in public education,7 thus rendering un-
constitutional racial segregation in public schools. It has been suggested 
that the Supreme Court, in Brown, declared that all classification by race 
is unconstitutional per se, and that public school segregation is merely one 
example of discrimination.8 The School Segregation Cases of 1954 were 
followed by a series of per curiam opinions extending the invalidity of 
racial segregation to public theaters,9 public beaches,10 public golf courses,11 
1 In addition, each plaintiff sought an award of $130,000.04 in satisfaction of com-
pensatory and punitive damages for "willful, deliberate, persistent, infuriating and un-
lawful conduct of the defendant." The court dismissed this part of action which it 
said was instituted in bad faith. Principal case at 793. 
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I. 
3 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880). See generally St. Antoine, Color Blindness 
But Not Myopia: A New Look at State Action, Equal Protection, and "Private" Racial 
Discrimination, 59 MICH. L. REv. 993 (1961). 
4 KA.UPER, FRONTIERS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY 188 (1956) • 
5 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896). 
6 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
7 Id. at 495. 
s BLAUSTEIN & FERGUSON, DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW 145 (1957). But see HAND, 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS 54 (1958) • 
9 Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954), vacating and re-
manding per curiam 202 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1953). 
10 Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877, affirming per curiam 220 F.2d 386 
(4th Cir. 1955) • 
11 Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879, vacating per curiam 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955). 
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state-regulated transportation,12 public parks,13 and state-regulated athletic 
contests.14 There would appear to be little doubt today that all state-
enforced racial segregation is unconstitutional.15 
The opinion in the principal case offered three reasons to justify the 
decision. The court first stated that the record showed no violation of 
rights granted to plaintiffs by the Constitution.16 This conclusion was based 
upon the premise that the fourteenth amendment does not grant any 
rights to citizens of the United States. Even accepting this premise, it 
would seem that the amendment is at least a restriction upon the states, 
guaranteeing to citizens protection from infringement by state action of 
rights they already possess. And since a right to non-segregated treatment 
has been established for public theaters17 and seating on buses,18 which 
are difficult to distinguish from that presented by the principal case, the 
court's first justification is unconvincing. The second ground relied upon 
was the federal policy of abstinence from interference in state affairs. How-
ever, implicit in the policy of abstinence is that no violation of the Consti-
tution has occurred, a questionable assumption in this case in view of the 
Supreme Court's recent interpretation of equal protection. Indeed, two 
of the cases19 quoted and cited as authority involved decisions to remand 
for construction of state statutes, and the third20 denied federal equity relief 
because of an adequate legal remedy available in the state courts. The 
third justification promulgated by the court involved the purpose of 
defendant's action, namely, to preserve decorum and to assure the orderly 
administration of justice to all, regardless of race or color. The Constitu-
tion secures a right to public trial in criminal cases,21 thus placing upon 
the states a duty to have courtrooms open to the public on certain oc-
casions. Moreover, the effective operation of courts is so important that 
judges are permitted to punish summarily for contempt in order to pre-
12 Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903, affirming per curiam 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. 
Ala. 1956). 
13 New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54, affirming per 
curiam 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1958). 
14 State Athletic Comm'n v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533 (1959) , affirming per curiam 168 
F. Supp. 149 (E.D. La. 1958) • 
15 See GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAw 46 (1959); Kauper, Trends 
in Constitutional Interpretation, 24 F.R.D. 155, 179 (1959); St. Antoine, supra note 3, 
at 994. 
16 Principal case at 794. 
17 See note 9 supra. 
18 See note 12 supra. 
10 Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 
U.S. 496 (1941). 
20 Mathews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521 (1932). 
21 Federal courts are explicitly required to grant public trials in criminal cases. 
U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment has been 
interpreted as placing a similar requirement upon the states. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 
(1948) , 46 MICH. L. R.Ev. 979. 
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serve decorum.22 Similar discretionary power is not even available to other 
state officials in the exercise of the police power for maintaining public 
peace. With such powerful control over the conduct of persons in the 
courtroom, it seems that a court has little need to require segregated seat-
ing. Indeed, it is suggested that separation of races in a courtroom is more 
difficult to justify than segregated recreational facilities. 
Although no attempt was made in the principal case to distinguish the 
recent interpretations of equal protection, the court obviously felt that it 
was not bound by decisions involving schools and recreation facilities. 
This indicates that all federal courts23 are not convinced that state-enforced 
classification by race is unconstitutional per se. Some judicial doubt is 
perhaps justified. The fundamental principle enunciated in Brown v. 
Board of Educ., that separate facilities are inherently unequal, was expressly 
limited to public schools.24 The principle has been developed and given 
new application by the per curiam process, a method which several writers 
have criticized.211 The result in the principal case indicates that a broader 
opinion is needed to clarify the scope of the equal protection restriction 
upon racial classification. Forthcoming in such an opinion should be the 
recognition that all state-enforced racial segregation is inherently dis-
criminatory. 
Thomas W. Van Dyke 
22 Defendant in the principal case had power to punish summarily for contempt. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-.26 (1960). 
23 In addition to the principal case, see the dissent in Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 
707 (M.D. Ala. 1956) • 
24 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
25 E.g., Kauper, supra note 15, at 181; Wechsler, Toward Neutf'al Principles of Consti-
tutional Law, 73 HAllv. L. REv. 1, 22 (1959) • 
